Does it Take Two to Tango? How to Improve Cooperation Between the IMF and the World Bank
Despite a series of official agreements aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund cooperation, it is widely believed that coordination between the two organizations often falls short of what should be rationally expected. In this paper we present a theoretical model which, focusing on the quality of information transmission between the IMF and the WB, analyzes the impact of different governance structures on the degree of Bank-Fund cooperation. We compare the performance of a "delegation-scheme" with that of a "centralization-scheme." A centralized structure better addresses the necessity of coordinating policy actions but greater consistency between the Bank and the Fund policy actions will be achieved at the expenses of a less satisfactory adaptation to "local conditions." When the need for coordination is relevant, as it is in general the case for the Bank and the Fund operations, we find that a centralized governance structure allows to achieve a level of overall payoff greater than those of a decentralized one
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 2012 erstellt
Other identifiers:
10.2139/ssrn.2291268 [DOI]
Classification:
D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions