Does monitoring affect corruption? Career concerns and home bias in football refereeing
This article evaluates refereeing bias in football games. Using a data set for Brazilian Championship, we find that referees systematically favour home teams setting more extra time in close matches in which home teams are behind. Career concerns seem to be relevant, since monitoring inhibits this behaviour and the effect of the refereeing bias on the probability of scoring in the extra time is quantitatively negligible.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Rocha, Bruno ; Sanches, Fábio ; Souza, Igor ; Silva, José Carlos Domingos da |
Published in: |
Applied Economics Letters. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 1350-4851. - Vol. 20.2013, 8, p. 728-731
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Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
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