Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Dickinson, David L. ; Villeval, Marie Claire |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verdrängungseffekt | Crowding out | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Vertrauen | Confidence |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (44 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 2004 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.571705 [DOI] |
Classification: | M5 - Personnel Economics ; J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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