Does price fixing benefit corporate managers?
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Artiga González, Tanja ; Schmid, Markus M. ; Yermack, David L. |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 65.2019, 10, p. 4813-4840
|
Subject: | price fixing | cartels | corporate governance | executive compensation | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Kartell | Cartel | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Preiskartell | Price-fixing cartel | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition |
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