Does privatising public service provision reduce accountability?
Year of publication: |
2006-10
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ellman, Matthew |
Institutions: | Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
Subject: | Public Services | Privatisation | Voter Mobilisation | Accountability | Government Responsiveness | Contract Length | Incomplete Contracts | Holdup |
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