Does Stardom Affect the Informativeness of a CEO’s Insider Trades?

This study examines whether the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) affects the informativeness of his insider trades. Using three different measures to identify star CEOs in a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that trades of non-star CEOs predict future abnormal returns and earnings innovations and that trades of star CEOs do not. The predictive power of non-star CEO trades is mostly attributable to opportunistic trades, not routine trades. We also find evidence suggesting that the abnormal returns associated with non-star CEO insider trades are due to the lower visibility and consequently less scrutiny of non-star CEOs compared with star CEOs

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Sabherwal, Sanjiv
Other Persons:	Uddin, Mohammad Riaz (contributor)
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Insiderhandel \| Insider trading \| Führungskräfte \| Managers

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (54 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Forthcoming, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 9, 2019 erstellt
Classification:	G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G23 - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions ; G29 - Financial Institutions and Services. Other
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861236