Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ghosal, Sayantan ; Kannika Thampanishvong |
Published in: |
Journal of international economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-1996, ZDB-ID 120143-8. - Vol. 89.2013, 1, p. 68-78
|
Subject: | Sovereign debt | Coordination | Moral hazard | Collective Action Clauses | Ex ante | Ex post | Moral Hazard | Internationale Staatsschulden | International sovereign debt | Schuldenmanagement | Debt management | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt |
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