Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bochet, Olivier ; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 185.2020, p. 1-30
|
Subject: | Lattice | Pareto dominance | Sequential allotment rules | Strategy-proofness | Truthtelling | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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