Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Courtin, Sébastien ; Nùnez, Matias |
Institutions: | Théorie Économique, Modélisation, Application (THEMA), Université de Cergy-Pontoise |
Subject: | Approval voting | Strategic voting | Dominance-solvability | Condorcet Winner |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 2013-27 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
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