Dominant shareholders, excess control and audit fees in Canada
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Bozec, Yves ; Bozec, Richard |
Published in: |
International journal of accounting and finance. - Genève : Inderscience Enterprises, ISSN 1752-8224, ZDB-ID 2484196-1. - Vol. 4.2013, 2, p. 119-142
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Subject: | excess control | ownership concentration | dominant shareholders | agency costs | expropriation | family ownership | audit fees | Canada | Kanada | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Honorar | Fee (Remuneration) | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Aktionäre | Shareholders |
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