Donor reaction to salient disclosures of nonprofit executive pay : a regression-discontinuity approach
Year of publication: |
August 2016
|
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Authors: | Galle, Brian ; Walker, David I. |
Published in: |
Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, ISSN 0899-7640, ZDB-ID 1056982-0. - Vol. 45.2016, 4, p. 787-805
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Subject: | higher education | executive compensation | disclosure | agency costs | Führungskräfte | Managers | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Nonprofit-Organisation | Nonprofit organization | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Lohn | Wages | Hochschule | Higher education institution |
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