DOUBLE DIPPING IN POLLUTION MARKETS

We explore the efficiency of allowing participants in transferable-rights programs to sell credits in multiple markets, i.e., to double dip. In a first-best economy double-dipping is efficient, but if the cap is set suboptimally, then the answer depends on the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Woodward, Richard T. ; Han, Manseung
Institutions:	Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA
Subject:	Environmental Economics and Policy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO Number 20323
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005500366