Unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e. drones) are quickly being adopted by many countries, corporations, international organizations, police and immigration forces and by the general population. Consider that you can now buy a drone to fly, spy and record for as little as US$300. Although public purchase and use of drones is an important area of research, our focus is on the large unmanned aerial vehicles, hereafter referred to as drones, that are equipped with missiles and bombs that have progressively become the newest wave in ‘warfare.’ Historically, drones have been used primarily for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes. This includes drones used in World War II, Vietnam, the Israeli/Syrian conflict, and the Persian Gulf War. The use of drones, however, has increased since the US began using them in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan (2001) for reconnaissance, and in 2002 when an unmanned Predator drone was used to carry out a targeted killing. Consider that since 2007 the United States has carried out attacks and targeted killings in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Mali, Somalia and Yemen. Israel has used drones in air strikes in Egypt and Sudan as well as the occupied territories (Cole 2013). The technological advances being made and the growing numbers of ‘battle-equipped’ drones being bought and used by countries have prompted non-governmental agencies, military units and journalists to praise as well as criticize their capabilities and the government policies guiding their use. However, until lately social scientists have generally neglected to pay attention to this growing phenomenon. We hope to begin to address this glaring gap by suggesting that the use of these drones for targeted assassinations is a normality of governing a modern capitalistic state. Our primary focus is on the United States as it is and continues to be the global leader in terms of using and legitimating this new technology in its war against terror. In order to understand the use of drones in modern warfare, the authors place the rise of drones in the context where crisis, exception and emergency are not sporadic events for states in the context of war but a constant choice of political management/administration in the exercise of violence. As noted by Neocleous (2006), over the course of the twentieth century and up to 4 September 2011 the US has declared thirty national emergencies. Further, it is through law that violent state actions and policies, such as the use of drones and targeted assassinations, conducted in ‘emergency conditions,’ become legitimated, legalized and normalized. Simply, we suggest that the use of drones for targeted assassinations is one small example of state violence that is increasingly becoming an accepted and regular exercise of US power that works alongside and within the rule of law as a political strategy in the ongoing construction and reunification of social order. As Singer (2009: 19) rightly notes, ‘[a]n amazing revolution is taking place on the battlefield, starting to change not just how wars are fought, but also the politics, economics, laws, and ethics that surround war itself.’ As Neocleous (2006) rightly notes, examination of the laws of war reveals that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the laws of war have been articulated to privilege military necessity at the cost of humanitarian values. ‘As a result, the laws of war have facilitated rather than restricted wartime violence’ (Jochnick and Normand 1994: 50)
