Duality in procurement design
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Manelli, Alejandro Marcelo ; Vincent, Daniel Robert |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 40.2004, 3/4, p. 411-428
|
Subject: | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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