Dynamic Advertising with Spillovers: Cartel vs Competitive Fringe

A differential oligopoly game with advertising is investigated, where different dynamics occur between two groups of agents, the former playing a competitive Nash game and the latter cooperating as a cartel. Sufficient conditions for stability and a qualitative analysis of the profit ratio and social welfare at equilibrium are provided. A threshold value for the size of the competitive fringe is pointed out by a suitable numerical simulation.

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Year of publication:	2007-07
Authors:	Lambertini, Luca ; Palestini, Arsen
Institutions:	Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA)
Subject:	Advertising \| Differential games \| Oligopoly \| Collusion

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Series:	Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; M37 - Advertising
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069746