Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
We study coalition formation processes of Konishi and Ray (2003) [27]. It is shown that an absorbing and deterministic process of coalition formation that also forms an equilibrium - satisfies a coalitional one-deviation property - does exist if one allows the process to be history dependent. All such dynamic equilibrium processes of coalition formation are characterized. Absorbing outcomes of dynamic equilibrium processes are also identified. It is shown that they always constitute a subset of the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994) [11]. A procedure that identifies a dynamic equilibrium process of coalition formation in finite time is constructed.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Vartiainen, Hannu |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 146.2011, 2, p. 672-698
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | One-deviation principle Coalition formation History dependence |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Introduction to Behavioral Economics and Its Applications
Diamond, Peter,
-
Auction Design without Commitment
Vartiainen, Hannu, (2003)
-
Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property
Vartiainen, Hannu, (2014)
- More ...