Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Giat, Yahel ; Subramanian, Ajay |
Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 37.2013, 12, p. 2833-2861
|
Subject: | Dynamic principal-agent models | Imperfect public information | Asymmetric beliefs | Hidden actions | Hidden states | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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