Dynamic Contracting Under Imperfect Public Information and Asymmetric Beliefs
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Giat, Yahel |
Other Persons: | Subramanian, Ajay (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2013]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (50 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 19, 2013 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1545952 [DOI] |
Classification: | D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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