Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schipper, Burkhard |
Published in: |
Dynamic games and applications : DGA. - Boston : Birkhäuser, ISSN 2153-0785, ZDB-ID 2610271-7. - Vol. 9.2019, 4, p. 1143-1167
|
Subject: | Strategic teaching | Learning | Adaptive heuristics | Dynamic optimization | Strategic substitutes | Strategic complements | Myopic players | Lernprozess | Learning process | Strategisches Management | Strategic management | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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