Dynamic managerial compensation : a variational approach
Year of publication: |
September 2015
|
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Authors: | Garrett, Daniel F. ; Pavan, Alessandro |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 159.2015, p. 775-818
|
Subject: | Incentives | Dynamic mechanism design | Adverse selection | Moral hazard | Persistent productivity shocks | Risk aversion | Moral Hazard | Adverse Selektion | Risikoaversion | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Produktivität | Productivity | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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