Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Garrett, Daniel ; Pavan, Alessandro |
Publisher: |
Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |
Subject: | dynamic mechanism design | adverse selection | moral hazard | incentives | optimal pay scheme | risk-aversion | stochastic process |
Series: | Discussion Paper ; 1491 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 63742557X [GVK] hdl:10419/59649 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1491 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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