Dynamic matching in school choice : efficient seat reassignment after late cancellations
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Feigenbaum, Itai ; Kanoria, Yash ; Lo, Irene ; Sethuraman, Jay |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 66.2020, 11, p. 5341-5361
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Subject: | dynamic matching | matching markets | school choice | deferred acceptance | tie breaking | cancellations | reassignments | Schulauswahl | School choice | Theorie | Theory | Matching | Schule | School |
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