Dynamic modeling of monetary and fiscal cooperation among nations

Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations analyzes coordination of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies between countries and currency areas using a dynamic game approach. The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions. TOC:International Policy Coordination.- Mathematical Background.- The Basic Symmetric Two-Country Model.- An MU Model with Active Monetary Policy.- Endogenous Coalition Formation Concepts.- Multi-Country Closed-Economy MU Model.- Accession to a Monetary Union.- World-wide Regional Policy Coordination.- By way of conclusion.- References.