Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
Francesc Dilmé
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Dilmé, Francesc |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 113.2019, p. 116-136
|
| Subject: | Dynamic moral hazard | Dynamic signaling | Endogenous effort | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Signalling | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Produktqualität | Product quality | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal ; Konferenzbeitrag ; Conference paper |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.010 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174470