Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions
Year of publication: |
2005-05-12
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Authors: | Lagunoff, Roger |
Institutions: | EconWPA |
Subject: | Recursive | dynamic political games | institutional reform | stability | dynamically consistent rules | inessential | recursive self selection |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Type of Document - pdf; pages: 33 33 pages |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances |
Source: |
-
The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions
Lagunoff, Roger, (2004)
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Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions
(2005)
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Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions
Lagunoff, Roger, (2005)
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A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary versus Involuntary Provision of Public Goods
Glomm, Gerhard, (1999)
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Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?
Lagunoff, Roger, (1999)
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"Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games"
Lagunoff, Roger, (1997)
- More ...