Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. Effectively, rules are "players" who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent. For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Lagunoff, Roger |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 67.2009, 2, p. 569-583
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Endogenous political institutions Recursive Dynamic political games Reform Stability Dynamically consistent rules Forward and backward consistency Inessential |
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