Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods and Optimal Steady-State Subsidies

This paper examines a differential game model of voluntary provision of a public good in which private agents' contributions accumulate over time and derives subsidy rules that achieve the socially efficient steady state. It is shown that the optimal subsidy rule is a simple one when agents use the open-loop strategy, while under Markovian strategies it intricately depends on the parameters of the economy. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	YANASE, AKIHIKO
Published in:	Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 8.2006, 1, p. 171-179
Publisher:	Association for Public Economic Theory - APET

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005157982