Dynamically consistent voting rules
Year of publication: |
December 2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chandrasekher, Madhav |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 160.2015, p. 175-187
|
Subject: | Aggregation of preferences | Dynamic consistency | Strategy-proofness | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
-
Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
Martínez, Ricardo, (2013)
-
Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
Pauly, Marc, (2013)
-
Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
Reffgen, Alexander, (2015)
- More ...
-
Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
Chandrasekher, Madhav, (2015)
-
Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
Chandrasekher, Madhav, (2015)
-
Discrete models of menu choice
Chandrasekher, Madhav, (2008)
- More ...