Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views. (JEL D71, D72, K10)
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Acemoglu, Daron ; Egorov, Georgy ; Sonin, Konstantin |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 102.2012, 4, p. 1446-76
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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