Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models

David K. Levine, Salvatore Modica

We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing Dynasty and rise of Communism in China.

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Year of publication:	January 2016
Authors:	Levine, David K. ; Modica, Salvatore
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 1, p. 89-131
Subject:	Evolution \| conventions \| markov chains \| state power \| Markov-Kette \| Markov chain \| Evolutionsökonomik \| Evolutionary economics \| Stochastischer Prozess \| Stochastic process \| Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Evolutionary game theory

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1978 [DOI] hdl:10419/150273 [Handle]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673072