Early versus Late Effort in Dynamic Agencies with Unverifiable Information
Year of publication: |
[2009]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schöndube, Jens Robert |
Publisher: |
[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (23 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: BuR Business Research Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 2008 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 20, 2009 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
The power of renegotiation and monitoring in software outsourcing : substitutes or complements?
Huang, He, (2021)
-
Anderlini, Luca, (1997)
-
Gebrauchsüberlassung komplexer Konsumgüter : eine ökonomische Analyse
Bagschik, Thorsten, (1999)
- More ...
-
Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion
Katolnik, Svetlana, (2015)
-
Relevance versus reliability of accounting information with unlimited and limited commitment
Schöndube-Pirchegger, Barbara, (2017)
-
Early Versus Late Effort in Dynamic Agencies with Unverifiable Information
Schöndube, Jens Robert, (2008)
- More ...