Earnings vs. stock-price based incentives in managerial compensation contracts
Year of publication: |
March 2016
|
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Authors: | Bernardo, Antonio E. ; Cai, Hongbin ; Luo, Jiang |
Published in: |
Review of accounting studies. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 1380-6653, ZDB-ID 1334761-5. - Vol. 21.2016, 1, p. 316-348
|
Subject: | Compensation | Investment policy | Mispricing | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Lohn | Wages | Börsenkurs | Share price | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option |
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