Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts : Essays in Honor of John E. Butterworth

I: Introduction -- John E. Butterworth’s Pioneering Contributions to the Accounting and Information Economics Literature -- to the Research Papers in this Volume -- II: Information Evaluation in Multiperson Contexts -- 1. Blackwell Informativeness and Sufficient Statistics with Applications to Financial Markets and Multiperson Agencies -- 2. The Social Value of Public Information in Production Economies -- 3. Costly Public Information: Optimality and Comparative Statics -- 4. Value of Information in Bimatrix Games -- III: Contracting in Agencies Under Moral Hazard -- 5. The Principal/Agent Problem—Numerical Solutions -- 6. Explorations in the Theory of Single- and Multiple-Agent Agencies -- 7. Sequential Choice Under Moral Hazard -- 8. Risk Sharing and Valuation Under Moral Hazard -- IV: Contracting in Agencies with Private Information -- 9. Communication of Private Information in Capital Markets: Contingent Contracts and Verified Reports -- 10. Managerial Compensation: Linear-Sharing vs. Bonus-Incentive Plans under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection -- 11. Intrafirm Resource Allocation and Discretionary Actions -- 12. Accountants’ Loss Functions and Induced Preferences for Conservatism -- Author Index.