Economic Models of Environment Monitoring under Imperfect Information and High Costs

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principal-agent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Levin, M. ; K. Matrosova.
Published in:	VOPROSY ECONOMIKI. - N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki". - Vol. 4.2014
Publisher:	N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki"
Subject:	monitoring \| environment \| pollution \| public goods \| externalities \| taxes \| corruption \| principal-agent problem

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D62 - Externalities ; D69 - Welfare Economics. Other ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860833