Economic targets and loss-aversion in international environmental cooperation
Year of publication: |
July 2016
|
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Authors: | İriş, Doruk |
Published in: |
Journal of economic surveys. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0950-0804, ZDB-ID 722946-X. - Vol. 30.2016, 3, p. 624-648
|
Subject: | Economic targets | Emission problem | International environmental agreements;Loss-aversion | Repeated game | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Welt | World |
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