Economics and Prescribed Fire Law in the United States
Prescribed burning is increasingly recognized as a useful but risky land management and conservation tool. Common law relating to prescribed fire is generally predicated on negligence rules. However, virtually all states also have statutory law specifying liability rules or criminal penalties for prescribed burning, and the laws in many states have been changing substantially in recent years. We develop an economic model of the incentive and welfare effects of prescribed burning, where both the burner and potential victims of escaped fires can reduce expected damage with precautionary effort. The model provides implications regarding the comparative advantages of strict liability versus negligence rules. We then examine the characteristics and geographic distribution of prescribed fire liability law in the United States in the context of the model. Specifically, we discuss possible economic underpinnings of the recent emergence of statutes in southeastern states that are more supportive of prescribed fire use, despite its associated risks. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Yoder, Jonathan ; Tilley, Marcia ; Engle, David ; Fuhlendorf, Samuel |
Published in: |
Review of Agricultural Economics. - Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA, ISSN 2040-5790. - Vol. 25.2003, 1, p. 218-233
|
Publisher: |
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Economics and prescribed fire law in the United States
Yoder, Jonathan, (2003)
-
Economics and Prescribed Fire Law in the United States
Yoder, Jonathan, (2003)
-
The economic logic of prescribed burning law and regulation
Yoder, Jonathan, (2003)
- More ...