[fre] L'objectif de la nouvelle architecture du système financier international est de maîtriser l'instabilité financière internationale en améliorant la transparence et la surveillance des marchés, et en suscitant une plus grande responsabilité des acteurs, tant privés que publics, dans la prévention et la gestion des crises. Mais il est très improbable que la nouvelle architecture prenne la forme d'un ensemble de règles de droit dont la combinaison déboucherait sur un nouveau système s'imposant à la communauté internationale, à l'image de la création du FMI en 1944. Il s'agit d'une réponse pragmatique à l'instabilité financière internationale et non pas d'une avancée institutionnelle quant aux modes de gouvernance monétaire et financière à l'échelle internationale. Si l'ambition de consolider l'architecture financière internationale marque d'ores et déjà un infléchissement très net de doctrine, qui s'apparente à un nouveau compromis néo-libéral et se rapproche partiellement du libéralisme enchâssé de l'après-guerre, prôné par J. M. Keynes, ce compromis paraît tout à la fois ambigu et inachevé, autant dans ses fondements que dans sa mise en œuvre. Tel est l'objet de cette analyse que de cerner l'économie politique de cette architecture. On examine d'abord les contours officiels de la nouvelle architecture en montrant que ce programme est d'abord une réponse politique, impulsée par la diplomatie américaine et pilotée par le G 7, aux contagions systémiques des années 1990. On montre ensuite en quoi le projet d'architecture, compte tenu des fondements théoriques qui le sous-tendent et de la méthode mise en œuvre, peut être analysé comme un compromis pragmatique dont l'application reste encore inachevée et qui ne saurait pleinement répondre aux défis du risque systémique. [eng] Political economy of international financial architecture. . The objective of the new architecture of the international financial system is to master the international financial instability by improving the transparency and the supervision of markets, and by arousing a greatest sense of responsibility in the prevention and management of crises, of both private and public actors. But it is very improbable for the new architecture to take the form of rules of law whose combination would open on a new system forced upon the international community, to the image of the creation of the IMF in 1944. It is likely to be a pragmatic reply to the international financial instability rather than an institutional evolution of the modes of international monetary and financial governance. The ambition to consolidate the international financial architecture marks already a real change of doctrine, close to a new neoliberal compromise and partially nearing the postwar embedded liberalism recommended by Keynes. But this compromise appears all both ambiguous and unfinished, as much in its foundations that in its functioning. The object of this analysis is precisely to surround the political economy of this architecture. One examines first the official contours of the new architecture, by showing that this program is first a political reply, managed by the American diplomacy and piloted by the G 7, to the systemic contagion of the 90's. One shows then how the project of architecture, considering the theoretical underlying foundations as well as the adopted method, can be analyzed as a pragmatic compromise whose application remains at present unfulfilled, and which cannot be considered as a full reply to the challenges of systemic risk. embedded liberalism recommended by Keynes. But this compromise appears all both ambiguous and unfinished, as much in its foundations that in its functioning. The object of this analysis is precisely to surround the political economy of this architecture. One examines first the official contours of the new architecture, by showing that this program is first a political reply, managed by the American diplomacy and piloted by the G 7, to the systemic contagion of the 90's. One shows then how the project of architecture, considering the theoretical underlying foundations as well as the adopted method, can be analyzed as a pragmatic compromise whose application remains at present unfulfilled, and which cannot be considered as a full reply to the challenges of systemic risk.
