Economies with Asymmetrically Informed Agents: the Concept of Limit Information
In this paper, a new concept of "limit information" is introduced and studied for Arrow-Debreu type economies with asymmetrically informed agents. The concept is based on the so-called contractual approach that presumes that agents meet and form coalitions, where the concurrent exchange of commodities and information is realized. So, in the course of a natural exchange process, the agents' information is repeatedly transformed and accumulated, and agents learn and achieve limit information. It is proved that, for a monotone information sharing rule, limit information is unique, i.e., it does not depend of the chain of coalitions implemented in the process of interaction between economic agents.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Marakulin, Valery M. |
Published in: |
Journal of the New Economic Association. - New Economic Association - NEA. - 2009, 1-2, p. 62-85
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Publisher: |
New Economic Association - NEA |
Subject: | Exchange economy | contract | asymmetrical information | core |
Saved in:
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