Economizing in a Context of Strategizing : Governance Mode Choice in Cournot Competition

This paper builds on Riordan and Williamson (1985) by exploring the economizing choice of organizational form by firms competing in a homogeneous-good market. The paper investigates rivalrous firms' investment and organization choice in a Cournot competition. The model suggests that both governance cost and strategic interactions can influence which asset-organization pair each firm chooses. Application of the model is illustrated with a discussion of the cola wars and the organization of the fountain channel

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Vanden Bergh, Richard
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Strategisches Management \| Strategic management \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 1999 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014214270