Education and Taxation Policies in the Presence of Countervailing Incentives
I examine income taxation and education policy when the government cannot observe individual productivity, and there exist conflicting incentives for individuals to understate and overstate their productivity. In this setting I identify four possible equilibria, and discuss the corresponding taxation/education policy mix. I show that no general restrictions on optimal taxation and education policy emerge in this environment, but each equilibrium and corresponding policy package can be associated with a country on the basis of its relative income and preference for redistribution. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2008.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | KRAUSE, ALAN |
Published in: |
Economica. - London School of Economics (LSE). - Vol. 76.2009, 302, p. 387-399
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Publisher: |
London School of Economics (LSE) |
Saved in:
freely available
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