Efficiency and Information Transmission in Bilateral Trading

Robert Shimer, Iván Werning

We study pairwise trading mechanisms in the presence of private information and limited commitment, whereby either trader can walk away from a proposed trade when he learns the trading price. We show that when one trader's information is relevant for the other trader's value of the asset, optimal trading arrangements may necessarily conceal the traders' information. While limited commitment itself may not be costly, it shapes how prices transmit information

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Year of publication:	August 2015
Authors:	Shimer, Robert
Other Persons:	Werning, Iván (contributor)
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
Publisher:	Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Informationsverbreitung \| Information dissemination \| Handel \| Trade \| Effizienzmarkthypothese \| Efficient market hypothesis \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Preis \| Price \| OTC-Handel \| OTC market

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	NBER working paper series ; no. w21495
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
Other identifiers:	10.3386/w21495 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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