Efficiency and Punishment in a Coordination Game: Voluntary Sanctions in the Minimum Effort Game
Year of publication: |
2014-12
|
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Authors: | Lec, Fabrice Le ; Rydval, Ondrej ; Matthey, Astrid |
Institutions: | Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and Economics Institute (CERGE-EI) |
Subject: | coordination | minimum effort | order-statistic game | punishment | sanction | weakest link |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles |
Source: |
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Efficiency and punishment in a coordination game : voluntary sanctions in the minimum effort game
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