Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
Year of publication: |
October 2016
|
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Authors: | Kazumura, Tomoya ; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 47.2016, 3, p. 633-663
|
Subject: | Strategy-proofness | Efficiency | Multi-demand preferences | Unit-demand preferences | Non-quasi-linear preferences | Minimum price Walrasian rule | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics |
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