Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time
Year of publication: |
2009-01-30
|
---|---|
Authors: | Osório-Costa, António M. |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Repeated Games | Random Monitoring | Perfect and Imperfect Public Monitoring | Moral Hazard | Stochastic Processes |
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