Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need be neither symmetric nor independent. Multiple units may be owned or desired. Participation may be stochastic. We introduce a very mild notion of "a little independence." We prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient. For any alpha>0, inefficiency disappears at rate (1/n)^(2 alpha). Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Cripps, Martin W. ; Swinkels, Jeroen M. |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 74.2006, 1, p. 47-92
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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