Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?

Efficiency wage theory predicts that the wage per unit of effort will be lower in intensively monitored sectors. This wage differential will increase in effort. Using employer-employee matched data from Ghana we provide evidence supporting this hypothesis.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Strobl, Eric ; Walsh, Frank A.
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Effizienzlohn \| Leistungskontrolle \| Reallohn \| Schätzung \| Ghana \| efficiency wages \| monitoring

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 661
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	846330776 [GVK] hdl:10419/20832 [Handle]
Classification:	J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277068