Efficient Allocations in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Economy
Year of publication: |
2006-12-03
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Authors: | Williams, Noah |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
Subject: | moral hazard | dynamic contracting |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series 2006 Meeting Papers Number 138 |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; E23 - Production ; C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis |
Source: |
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