Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types
Year of publication: |
2012-01
|
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Morris, Stephen ; Takahashi, Satoru |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | Mechanism Design | Robust mechanism design | Efficient auctions | Interdepedent types | Partial implementation | Full implementation |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | CFP 1360 Published in American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings (May 2012), 102(3): 319-324 The price is None Number 1846 14 pages |
Classification: | C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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