Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types
We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modeling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a finite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting. We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types - developed in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) - applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type - belief type language.
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Morris, Stephen ; Takahashi, Satoru |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 102.2012, 3, p. 319-24
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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