Efficient Bargaining with Labor Under-Utilization

The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e. it uses fully its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with under-utilization of labor may actually occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under-utilization effectively occurs are studied.

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Year of publication:	1995-01-01
Authors:	Dehez, Pierre ; de la Croix, David ; Toulemonde, Eric
Institutions:	Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain

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Series:	Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Number 1995005 9 pages long
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984989